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THE SEARCH FOR MEANING: 
CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THE 
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 
Peter McRae* 
This paper argues that old controversies regarding the objects and methods of treaty 
interpretation have not been resolved by the coming into force of articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.  The articles, it is argued, have not so much resolved 
previous debates between "schools" of interpretation, as obscured them under an apparently clear 
regime, while interpreters continue to adopt their own preferences.  The paper describes the three 
main schools – textualist, intentions of the parties, and teleological – and concludes none offers a  
satisfactory scheme by itself.  It then examines the development of the Convention articles, and 
concludes they represented a compromise in which the drafters failed to resolve the key issue of the 
underlying purpose or object of interpretation.  It then shows that an orthodox interpretation of the 
articles has developed, which assumes they embody the textualist position.  The paper then discusses 
how this orthodoxy has been accepted by the majority of the International Court of Justice in the 
1990s, but with significant dissent drawing on insights from especially an intentions of the parties 
approach.  The paper then draws on insights from modern approaches to the interpretation of 
commercial  contracts, to suggest that the best resolution of the "text versus intentions" dichotomy 
lies in accepting that establishing the actual intentions of parties is the purpose of interpretation, 
and that therefore an apparently clear text will be strong but not conclusive evidence of such 
intentions.  The paper examines how this refinement would have helped to resolve difficult 
interpretations before the ICJ, and concludes that such an approach is both desirable and consistent 
with articles 31 and 32. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It might seem that controversy and uncertainty over the interpretation of treaties, 
which once provoked heated debates, into which even great legal writers ventured 
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uneasily,1 have now been dissipated.  Old doctrinal controversies on both the purposes 
and methods of interpretation have apparently been resolved by the codification of the law 
in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna 
Convention).2 Even more importantly, the articles have repeatedly been accepted as 
reflecting customary international law.3 Given their deliberately non-detailed nature,4 the 
articles will not by themselves resolve every difficult interpretation; they do however 
appear to give us a clear regime within which to work to achieve resolution. 
It is submitted that in reality the controversies have not gone away.  Recent decisions of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) show that the Court still tends to divide on 
interpretation issues.  This essay will argue in part that at least some of the division is 
traceable back to the old controversies about methods and, especially, purposes.  Overall it 
is better to suggest that articles 31 and 32 have temporarily obscured a debate, not resolved 
it.  If any real consensus is to be achieved on the purpose of and correct approach to treaty 
interpretation, articles 31 and 32 will require re-examination, leading to a better 
appreciation of how they should be applied. 
The essay will examine the original controversy of the "schools": The "textual", the 
"intentions of the parties", and the "teleological" schools.  Writers who have offered their 
own variants will also be considered.  The analysis will show that differences in approach 
arise not just from differences over the value of advocated methods, but rather from quite 
different conceptions of basic purpose – not just "how", but also "why" we interpret 
treaties. 
The history of articles 31 and 32 is then analysed, especially the International Law 
Commission's (ILC) work.  After examination of how the articles were viewed in the 20 
years after the Vienna Convention, I will then examine two ICJ cases from the 1990's which 
considered the articles, and treaty interpretation generally.   
  
1  Sir I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984) 114; Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1961) 364. 
2  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (22 May 1969) UNTS 1155 331.  [Vienna Convention] 
3  Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) [1994] ICJ 6, 21-22, para 41 
[Libya v Chad]; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1995] ICJ 6, 18, para 33 [Qatar v Bahrain]; Case concerning 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) [1999] ICJ 6, para 21, <www.icj-
cij.org/cijwww/cij/ccases/cbona/cbonabanner.htm> (last accessed 24 May 2001) [Kasikili Island]. 
4  See Report of the International Law Commission on Draft Articles (1966) II YBILC 169, 218 para 5.  
[ILC Commentary 1966] 
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As suggested above, this will show that while there has been the appearance of an 
agreed position, based on a "clear" meaning of the articles, there is no real consensus on 
either role or purpose, or methodology.  While there is a dominant view, based on one 
reading of articles 31 and 32, emphasising "primacy of the text",5 others, while paying lip-
service to the articles' customary laws status, find it necessary and possible to resort to a 
different approach reminiscent of the intentions school.  It is submitted that this continuing 
divergence points to real inadequacies in the orthodox position, which need to be resolved 
if there is to be any real clarity on the law.  Equally, a simple switch to an "intentions" 
approach is likely to be similarly inadequate.  It is necessary to look for a satisfactory 
synthesis, consistent with articles 31 and 32, which can lead to more consistently 
satisfactory interpretations in practice. 
Given the persistent differences, a complete resolution may not be possible.  However 
it is suggested that insight can be gained from reference to developments in the modern 
law of contract interpretation.  These emerging approaches, themselves still controversial, 
will help to put the claims of the various schools in perspective, and suggest how they may 
work together more satisfactorily.  Articles 31 and 32 are flexible enough, interpreted 
appropriately, to allow this "modern contract" approach, and this approach is more likely 
to lead to appropriate interpretation in practice. 
II BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY 
Modern writers accept that there have traditionally been three main "schools" in 
debates regarding the purpose of treaty interpretation.6 These are the textual or "ordinary 
or plain meaning" school, the "intentions of the parties" school, and the "purpose" or 
"teleological" school.   Other variations exist: McDougall and other Yale scholars appear to 
combine elements of intentions and teleology in an approach based on the "genuine shared 
expectations" of the parties,7 while others espouse a "contextual" approach,8 which can be 
seen as either a derivative of the textual approach, or an attempt at synthesis of all three 
  
5  See Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) YBILC II 5, 52, 
phrase used by Sir H Waldock [Waldock Third Report]; compare Libya v Chad, above, 22, para 41: 
"Interpretation must be based above all on the text of the treaty". 
6  D J Harris Cases and Materials on International Law (5 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1998) 810-811, 
quoting from G G Fitzmaurice; A Aust Modern treaty law and practice (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) 184. 
7  M S McDougall, H D Lasswell and J C Miller The Interpretation of International Agreements and 
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven Press, New Haven, 1994 
Reissue with additions).  See especially, Introduction to the Reissue, xxiii-lxxviii. 
8  Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) 365; see also ILC 
Proceedings (1964) I YBILC 195, para 27, Mr Reuter. 
  
212 (2002) 33 VUWLR 
main schools.  Yambrusic argues for the need to search for "objective intentions",9 and 
Stone argued that there are in fact no rules, but only fictions which act as a smokescreen 
for judicial creativeness.10 Given this variety, it is necessary to critically examine the 
schools, to assess their relative claims. 
A The Textual Approach 
This approach starts from a presumption that words will normally have an ordinary 
meaning, which is either self-evident, or is readily established by textual analysis.  It is 
therefore possible to reduce agreements to clear language, and there should rarely be any 
need to "go behind" that to seek deeper intentions.11 We should presume that the 
intentions of the parties are reflected in the words they have used, and the treaty text 
becomes "sauf de rares exceptions, la seule et la plus récente expression de la volunté 
commune des parties".12 Therefore the primary goal of interpretation is to ascertain the 
meaning of the text.13 This implies a reluctance to examine materials extrinsic to the treaty, 
as it is the words that matter.  It is the "intentions of the treaty", not of the parties, that we 
are to elucidate.14 
This approach is of ancient pedigree, and can be seen to draw authority from Vattel, 
who famously stated:  "[t]he prime general maxim of interpretation is that it is not 
permissible to interpret that which has no need of interpretation".15 While Sinclair suggests 
that this merely states the result of a process of interpretation, rather than a principle of 
interpretation itself, this is not obvious from the words themselves, and Haraszti points out 
  
9   E S Yambrusic Treaty Interpretation Theory and Reality (UPA, Lanham (Maryland), 1987) 249-251. 
10  J Stone "Fictional elements in treaty interpretation" (1955) 1 Sydney Law Review 344-368.   
11  G G Fitzmaurice "Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 'Interpretation' of it" 
(1971) 65 AJIL 358, 363.  [Fitzmaurice 1971] 
12  Comment of M Huber (1952) 44 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 199 [Annuaire]; quoted 
by Sir H Waldock in the Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) 
YBILC II 5, 56, para 13. 
13  Sir I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984), 115, summarising G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 
BYIL 203, 204-7. [Fitzmaurice 1957] 
14  Fitzmaurice 1971, above. 
15  E de Vattel Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle, appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des 
Nations et des Souverains Livre II, chapter XVII, quoted in G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of 
the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 91-92.  The full quotation continues: « 
Quand une Acte est conçu en termes clairs et précis, quand le sens en est manifeste et ne conduit à 
rien d'absurde : on n'a aucune raison de se refuser au sens que cet Acte présente naturellement. »  
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that both the ICJ and its predecessor have frequently relied by implication on Vattel to 
prohibit recourse to extrinsic aids, where a treaty was "sufficiently clear", and absent 
absurdity.16 Vattel therefore propounded and the courts often accepted a "plain meaning 
rule" of interpretation. 
A well-developed expression of this approach is given by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice.  
Arguing from his analysis of the World Court,17 Fitzmaurice enunciated six principles of 
interpretation.  The first three, especially I, Principle of actuality (or textuality) and II, 
Principle of the natural and ordinary meaning, encapsulate a mandatory textualist approach.18 
Nothing should get in the way of the "natural" or "ordinary" meaning, if it is "clear", and 
the interpreter need not and in theory cannot look any further if there is a clear reading.  It 
is presumed that this clear reading must be giving effect to what the parties intended. 
1  Critique 
The textual approach has usually been accepted as the majority or orthodox position,19 
and it is not difficult to see why.  A textual approach is easy to understand and relatively 
easy to execute.  The assumption that parties can generally be taken to mean what they say 
seems reasonable.20 Interpreters can make use of a simple reading, supplemented where 
necessary by more sophisticated logical tools, including judicious application of maxims 
such as a contrario or ejusdem generis, without having to turn these into legal rules.21 There 
will normally be neither need nor permission to turn to more wide-ranging but more 
complicated sources, such as preparatory works, as the presumption is that most texts will 
be explicable, and the meaning of the text is all that is required.  Interpreters can limit 
excursions to the "rare exceptions" anticipated by Huber.22 
This does tend to look like an argument of convenience or expediency – we should 
limit ourselves to a textual approach, as it is simpler and cheaper.  Jacobs has however 
  
16  Haraszti, above, 92-93.  Relevant cases include the Lotus case PCIJ Ser A 10, 16; the Admissions case, 
[1948] ICJ 63; and the Competence case [1950] ICJ 227. 
17  Both the ICJ and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). 
18  Fitzmaurice 1957, above, 205. 
19  See Sir H Waldock Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) 
YBILC II 5, 54, refers to "the majority of modern writers". 
20  See G G Fitzmaurice "Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiators! Your Treaty or Our 'Interpretation' of 
it" (1971) 65 AJIL 358, 363. 
21  See G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 
110-111 for discussion of the place of the logical principles, albeit from the standpoint of an 
advocate of an intentions approach. 
22  See M Huber (1952) 44 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 199. 
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argued that the textual approach can be justified on grounds of principle and policy.23 The 
real problem for an ordinary meaning approach however is that words are rarely or never 
sufficiently or consistently clear.  McLauchlan has argued convincingly that it is not 
possible to say that words have a "fixed", or a "plain" meaning or a "proper signification", 
independent either of the writer or reader.24 Like Lauterpacht,25 he refers to Oliver W 
Holmes:26 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchangeable, it is a skin of a living thought and may 
vary in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time it is used. 
In treaties, even more so than in other formal documents, there is almost inevitably 
ambiguity, shades of meaning, and room for differing views.  This comes in part from 
treaties frequently being plurilingual, and also they are, even more than contracts, often 
the results of difficult negotiations between parties with widely differing interests, where 
things may be deliberately left unsaid for political or diplomatic reasons, or where an 
ambiguous formula allows several parties to each feel they have achieved their objectives.  
Lauterpacht quotes the Treaty of Lausanne 1924 as one example.27 Qatar v Bahrain is a 
modern case, where the words allowed both sides to think they had got what they 
wanted.28  
This prevalence, even "natural" occurrence of ambiguity means it is possible for several 
different interpreters to conclude they have arrived at the single, clear and ordinary 
meaning of a term, while in fact coming to different or opposite meanings.29 This not only 
undermines the effectiveness of a textual approach, as it does not satisfactorily resolve 
anything, but it also suggests that it will often be only a smokescreen or post facto 
  
23  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
342. 
24  D McLauchlan "The Plain Meaning Rule of Contract Interpretation" (1996) 2 NZBLQ 80, 84. 
25  H Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of Treaties" (1949) 26 BYIL 48, 53.  [Lauterpacht 1949] 
26  Towne v Eisner (1918) 245 US 418, 425; McLauchlan, above, 85. 
27  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 77-78. 
28  Qatar v Bahrain [1995] ICJ 6, 18; see discussion below in part V. 
29  See G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 
93-94, shows that in both the Competence and Asylum cases, different members of the Court came 
to opposite meanings for disputed terms, each holding that any other meaning was 
"inconceivable" as the meaning was "clear". 
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justification for a decision which an interpreter reaches by other means.30 A textual 
approach can be both arbitrary and uncertain, casting significant doubt on its ability to 
deliver the advantages argued for it. 
2 Variations 
Some would argue that textualism is never as rigid as it appears in theory.  The 
approach accepts that documents will sometimes be ambiguous, necessitating a wider 
range of tools – it merely suggests ambiguity is less prevalent or likely than others 
consider.  In any case, what is being set out in Fitzmaurice's principles, even arguably in 
articles 31 and 32, is a contextual approach, not a rigid textual one.31 Words only have 
meaning in their context, and this is clearly allowed for in Fitzmaurice's principle III.32 This 
approach is embodied in the 1956 Resolution of the Institute of International Law,33 and is 
also at the heart of McNair's synthesis.34 
The problem with context is how wide should it be.  To the textualist, it will merely be 
the words or the text in their context, no broader than the treaty itself, whereas McNair 
envisages something wider, and proponents of intentions or teleology will not see any 
reasons to limit it at all.  If the contextual approach is no more than a more nuanced 
version of the textual, then it will still be interested in revealing only the meaning of the 
text, and will be subject to the same criticisms.  If its purposes are in fact broader, then it 
may be better placed under one of the other schools, or may in fact be a genuine synthesis.  
The question of possible syntheses will be returned to in section VI. 
  
30  See Lauterpacht 1949, above, 53-55, especially his discussion of the resolution of interpretation 
issues in Corfu Channel Merits [1949] ICJ 24. 
31  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
334-335. 
32  G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Treaty 
Interpretation and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 BYIL 203, 205. 
33  Quoted in Sir H Waldock Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) 
YBILC II 5, 55. 
34  Lord McNair The Law of Treaties (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) 365: Tribunals are to 
give effect to "[the parties'] intention as expressed in the words used by them in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances".   
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B The Intentions of the Parties 
For the "intentions" school, the primary or only goal of interpretation is to establish the 
intention of the parties, so it can be given effect.35 As Hersch Lauterpacht, the most notable 
proponent of this approach put it:36 
It is the duty of the judge to resort to all available means – including rules of construction – to 
discover the intentions of the parties; to avoid using rules of interpretation as a ready 
substitute for active and independent search for intention; and to refrain from neglecting any 
possible clues, however troublesome may be their examination and however liable they may 
be to abuse, which may reveal or render clear the intention of the authors of the rule to be 
interpreted. 
Several points emerge.  First, the disagreements between the schools are about more 
than method.  The debate is about the purpose or object of treaty interpretation, not just 
allowable or preferable techniques.  Secondly, the position we take on purpose affects the 
approach to methods.  As the intentions school is unwilling to ascribe a life or meaning of 
its own to text, it more easily accepts that no possible tool for interpretation, which might 
reveal actual intentions, should be excluded.  The intentions school will usually begin with 
text, but look also to context, broadly defined, consider evidence contained in preparatory 
works or other sources, use supposed "rules" such as a contrario as a guide or aid where 
useful, and examine the subsequent conduct of the parties as evidence of intentions.  
Thirdly, there is at least some distinction between the act of interpretation and that of 
application, even though one follows the other.37 By contrast, for the textualist, if 
interpretation is achieved by ascertaining the ordinary meaning, then there is arguably no 
separate process of application, as the application proceeds naturally from the clarified 
ordinary meaning. 
While the intentions school denies Huber's contention that the words of the text are the 
authentic expression of the will of the parties – and therefore all that need be explained – 
the position does not deny an important place to text.  In proposed draft articles for the ILI, 
  
35  See Sir I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984) 114. 
36  H Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of Treaties" (1949) 26 BYIL 48, 83. 
37  See G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 
29 on the difference between interpretation and the act of application to a particular case. 
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Lauterpacht made it clear it was necessary to: "prendre le sens naturel des termes comme 
point de départ du processus d'interprétation".38 
While it has been argued that Lauterpacht's inclusion of the text as a starting point was 
probably a negotiating concession to textualists, the intentions school does recognise the 
weight an apparently unambiguous text carries.  It merely does not accept it as decisive, 
given the different conception of the underlying purpose.  If in a particular case there is 
better and contradicting evidence, it cannot be ignored. 
1 Critique 
On one level the intentions approach is hard to argue with.  It is easy to see that the 
underlying object is a purer version than that aimed at by the textual approach: one is 
looking for actual common intentions, rather than merely presuming that some of the 
words used are the only possible expression of common will.  This suggests an intentions 
approach is more likely to give effect to good faith and the basic imperative of pacta sunt 
servanda.39 It is treaties which must be given effect to in good faith, not merely words.  On 
an equally fundamental level, it can be argued that an intentions approach is required by 
the consensual basis of international law:40 Intentions, rather than presumed intentions 
based on an expression, must be preferable. 
There are of course immediate objections to this apparent superiority.  Firstly it is 
significant that it is often referred to as the "subjective" school, often by Anglo-Saxon 
commentators.41 There is an inherent distrust of the subjective as ultimately unknowable, 
uncertain and therefore unattainable.  It is significant that Sinclair42 contrasts the subjective 
school with the textual or "objective": That which is objective is surely more likely to 
provide stronger evidence and better analysis. 
  
38  H Lauterpacht (1950) 43 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 433.  Principle 2 enshrines 
widest possible resort to preparatory works, even where the words are "clear" but contested. 
39  Vienna Convention, Article 26. 
40  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
321, also makes this point. 
41  See for instance G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 
Treaty Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points" (1951) BYIL 1; See Sir I Sinclair The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 114-115; 
Jacobs, above, 320-322, and throughout. 
42  Sinclair, above, 115. 
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Linked to the suspicion of subjectivity is the apparent uncertainty of many of the 
proposed sources.  Preparatory works are likely to support both sides of an argument,43 
and may be misleading or incomplete.44 Similar or greater difficulties attach to other 
extrinsic sources, such as the circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty.  The intentions 
approach may be impossible of appropriate application. 
These objections are not in fact the most damaging to the intentions approach.   
"Subjective" is no more than a label, and it would be equally accurate to refer to an enquiry 
into parties' "actual" rather than "subjective" intentions.  Evidence provided in an analysis 
of intentions should be subject to tests of reliability, and it has already been shown above 
that the text is not necessarily certain either.  Finally, the reality is that preparatory works 
will be referred to almost routinely.45 Whether the text or other sources provide the most 
conclusive evidence of intentions and therefore meaning will vary between cases, and 
should not be arbitrarily restricted. 
The more difficult criticism is that common intention is often illusory.  While the critics 
point this out,46 Lauterpacht himself is alert to the issue, listing five discrete cases where 
there will be no actual common intention.47 
While the principle of good faith may deal with some of these categories,48 Lauterpacht 
advocates in the end for such cases a process of analysis, considering all the circumstances 
including what can be said of common intentions that do or did exist, and the treaty 
purpose, to arrive at an "effective", "assumed" or "imputed" intention.49 Lauterpacht 
  
43  H Lauterpacht (1950) 43 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 433, Sir Eric Beckett; and Jacobs, 
above, 339. 
44  Report of the International Law Commission on Draft Articles (1966) II YBILC 20, 51.  [ILC 
Commentary 1966] 
45  ILC Commentary 1966, above, 223. 
46  G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty 
Interpretation and Certain other Treaty Points" (1951) BYIL 1; H Lauterpacht (1950) 43 Annuaire de 
l'Institut de droit international 433, 435-444; and J Stone, "Fictional Elements in Treaty 
Interpretation" 1 Sydney Law Review (1955) 344, 347-350. 
47  H Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
of Treaties" (1949) 26 BYIL 48, 76-82.   The different categories include: Where the parties each 
unknowingly attribute different meanings to the same words; where one party is aware of the 
other's misapprehension of what has been included, and hopes to benefit from the ambiguity; 
where the parties use an ambiguous or non-committal expression to deal with a point of 
disagreement; where the parties gave no thought to the actual situation which later arises; and 
where different provisions of the same treaty are mutually contradictory. 
48  See for instance Lauterpacht 1949, above, 77 on the ambiguity by design problem.    
49  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 79, 81. 
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considers this will be "no mere fiction",50 but Stone51 certainly and textualists probably 
would not agree.  In the end, the intentions school runs into the same limitation as 
textualism: it will often be based on presumptions not only impossible of proof but 
actually untrue.  In the case of intentions it arguably undercuts the very purpose the school 
aims at. 
It is not necessary to agree with Jacobs, that Lauterpacht's difficulty leads him into 
teleology.52 Lauterpacht relies so far as possible on whatever actual common intention is 
available, and limits the application of the principle of effectiveness, or effective 
interpretation, to what the parties intended: the parties may have intended the treaty to be 
less than fully effective over the potential subject matter and range of objects of their 
treaty.53 Even so, given that Lauterpacht concedes there will be many occasions where 
there is no common intention,54 it is clear that the intentions approach cannot be a 
complete system of interpretation.  There is therefore room for frequent controversy about 
whether any particular situation falls within one of the five categories, or is amenable to 
resolution by an intentions analysis, and the method may be guilty of muddying waters it 
seeks to clarify.  Lauterpacht felt able, even compelled, to fill gaps in intentions, as signed 
treaties are part of international law, which allows no gaps.55 However he therefore would 
presume or imply intention, which he himself argued predicates that intention does not 
matter.56 It must be accepted that the fully developed scheme of the intentions approach is 
simply too optimistic in its claims. 
2 Variations 
An intentions-based approach is important to some writers who are not adherents of 
the school.  Yambrusic considers that interpretation is a "complex intellectual exercise".57 
Where however only apparent or objective intention can ever be found, as "the content of the 
  
50  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 79. 
51  J Stone, "Fictional elements in treaty interpretation" 1 Sydney Law Review (1955) 344, 348. 
52  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
321. 
53  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 74. 
54  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 76. 
55  Lauterpacht 1949, above. 
56  Lauterpacht 1949, above, 75. 
57  E S Yambrusic Treaty Interpretation Theory and Reality (UPA, Lanham MD, 1987) 250. 
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individual wills is always heterogeneous".58 Intention is always a construct, even if it is 
"objectively" obtained from words and circumstances. 
This thesis seems unnecessarily pessimistic.  Taken to its logical conclusion, it in fact 
denies the consensual basis of international law.  In the end, while Yambrusic clearly 
considers the textual approach inadequate on its own, the denial of actual intentions 
essentially limits the product of interpretation to a construct in the mind of the interpreter. 
By contrast, McDougall, Lasswell and Miller (McDougal) start from thoroughgoing 
acceptance of the importance of subjective intentions.  After positing a complex 
communications theory with few if any interactions or influences out of the mix,59 
McDougal argues that the "primary aim" of interpretation is to "discover the shared 
expectations that the parties to the relevant communication have succeeded in creating in 
each other".60 The interpreter is not limited by any over-reliance on any particular text, but 
must effectively reconstruct the whole series of dealings to determine what the parties did 
or did not succeed in achieving.61 This leads to what Jacobs has described as an American 
"inclusive" approach to interpretation, where no source is excluded, and none takes 
precedence, except based on the evidence of the specific case.62 
This looks like intentions, allied to modern communications theory.  However the 
theory does not stop there, and McDougal defines an explicitly separate application phase 
which must be conducted once the shared subjectivity has been established.  Of course, 
adherents of an intentions approach will often also point out that application is a separate 
and subsequent process,63 but for McDougall it takes on a strongly teleological shape.  
Appliers must make use of supplementation to cover gaps and remaining ambiguities, and 
of policing and integration to determine the most appropriate outcome.64 In doing so, they 
  
58  Yambrusic, above, 248. 
59  M S McDougall, H D Lasswell and J C Miller The Interpretation of International Agreements and 
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven Press, New Haven, 1994 
Reissue with additions). xii-xvi. 
60  McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, above, xvi. 
61  McDougall, Lasswell and Miller, above, xvii-xviii. 
62  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
324. 
63  G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 29. 
64  McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, above, ix-xx. 
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are explicitly making choices based on "basic community policy", and using the process of 
application to shape world order.65 
This makes McDougal's approach subject to the same criticisms raised in respect of 
extreme teleological schemes, discussed below, in terms of legislating rather than clarifying 
law.  This seems a curious blend, given the passionate commitment to uncovering actual 
expectations.  It is difficult to accept that if genuine shared expectations are so important, 
they can be overridden, if not by a "clear" text, then by a wider programme.   
C Teleological Interpretation 
A clear statement of the teleological approach is contained in the Harvard Research 
Draft Convention on the law of treaties, especially its proposed article 19 (a) and the 
associated commentary:66 
The process of interpretation … cannot be … a mere mechanical one of drawing inevitable 
meanings from the words in a text, or of … discovering some pre-existing specific intention of 
the parties with respect to every situation … In most instances … interpretation involves 
giving a meaning to a text … which is logical, reasonable and most likely to accord with and to 
effectuate the larger general purpose which the parties desired the treaty to serve. 
This approach therefore focuses not on the literal meaning of the text per se, or the 
parties' intentions, but rather on the purpose of the treaty, and on giving effect to that.   At 
a most basic level, this may be no more than using the treaty purpose as evidenced by the 
treaty text itself, to clarify the meaning of unclear provisions, as a natural corollary of the 
textual approach, or alternatively a matter of giving effect to the true intention of the 
parties, once established.67 However, the broader or more general the alleged purpose is 
allowed to be defined, the more scope there is for interpretive activism and "development" 
of the meaning, independent of the literal text or the actual will of the parties.  Effectively, 
under a teleological approach, a treaty may have its terms amended or augmented, if this 
is found to be in keeping with the "general purpose".68 In fact it is highly arguable that 
draft article 19(a) also implies the doctrine of "emergent purpose",69 so that even the 
  
65  McDougal, Lasswell and Miller, above, ixxiii. 
66  Harvard Research in International Law "Law of Treaties" (1935) 29 AJIL Supp 653, 939. [Harvard] 
67  F Jacobs "Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 
319. 
68  G Haraszti Some Fundamental Problems of the Law of Treaties (Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973) 
113. 
69  Jacobs, above, 320. 
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original, intended purpose need not control, but rather a later conception of how the 
purpose should be understood in modern conditions.70 
The approach is particularly directed at multilateral law-making treaties, and has been 
used to interpret and develop the constitutive documents of international organisations.71 
It has arguably been adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, for instance in the 
Golder case,72 and may have resulted in the Court amending rather than interpreting the 
treaty. 
1 Critique 
In its more innocuous forms, the teleological approach is hardly a separate approach at 
all, but merely sensible use of available interpretative resources.  Similarly, it could, if 
appropriately contained be no more than an outworking of the principle of effectiveness, 
which both major schools accept within limits.73 In determining how parties might give 
appropriate effect to a treaty, it seems only right that appropriateness be judged in the light 
of objects and purposes.  The problem with the approach however is that given its broad 
conception, and its tendency to deny, at least in the Harvard Draft form, any hard and fast 
limitations or rules,74 it is equally or more likely to operate quite differently, as a licence to 
judicial activism or legislation.  In the more developed form it may once again be seen not 
so much as a form of interpretation, but a quite separate activity, which may or may not be 
appropriate in certain cases, such as in dealing with the development of international 
  
70  Harvard Research Draft Convention on the law of treaties, Article 19(a) includes in part:  
… the circumstances of the parties at the time the treaty was entered into, the change in 
these circumstances sought to be effected … and the conditions prevailing at the time the 
interpretation is being made, are to be considered in connection with the general purpose 
which the treaty is intended to serve.  
Harvard Research in International Law "Law of Treaties" (1935) 29 AJIL Supp 653, 937. 
71  See C F Amerasinghe Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge 
University Press, England, 1996), 25.  Jacobs, above, cites as generally accepted that for 
constitutional documents of international organisations objects and purposes may have to be 
interpreted in the light of subsequent developments in international organisation. 
72  Golder Case (1975) 57 ILR 209 (ECHR); see Sir I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(2 ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 131-133. 
73  G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Treaty 
Interpretation and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 BYIL 203, principle IV; H Lauterpacht 
"Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties" 
(1949) 26 BYIL 48, 74. 
74  Harvard, above, 939. 
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organisations.75 Given its capacity to undermine international law as the product of 
consenting states, its implementation as a general approach to interpretation appears both 
unwarranted and unlikely. 
III  DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION ARTICLES 
A Early Activity  
The nature or possibility of legal rules covering interpretation remained contentious 
throughout the 1950s and early 60s.  Many of the key contributions to the academic debate 
come from this period.76 Despite statements by the majority of the ICJ adopting a textual 
approach,77 the debate continued off and on through the work of the International Law 
Institute (ILI) from 1950 through to 1956, and it seemed to contemporaries that the attempt 
at resolution was abandoned due to impossibility.78 With Fitzmaurice as Special 
Rapporteur the ILI did agree articles in 1956 adopting a textual approach, but in vague and 
uncertain terms.79 It is therefore hardly surprising that members of the ILC initially 
approached their consideration of interpretation with pessimism and scepticism.80 
  
75  The ILC in its commentary explicitly decided not to include any commentary on interpretation of 
international organisation instruments, as the matter was controversial, and a special case: ILC 
Commentary (1964) II YBILC, 205, para 17.  [ILC Commentary 1964] 
76  See for instance G G Fitzmaurice "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 
1951-4: Treaty Interpretation and other Treaty Points" (1957) 33 BYIL 203; G G Fitzmaurice "The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain other 
Treaty Points" (1951) BYIL 1; H Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of 
Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties" (1949) 26 BYIL 48; J Stone, "Fictional Elements in 
Treaty Interpretation" 1 Sydney Law Review (1955) 344, and the contributions of M Huber (1952) 
44 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 199; L Eckert (1950) 43 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit 
international 366; H Lauterpacht (1950) 43 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 433, G G 
Fitzmaurice (1956) 56 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 317, and others to ILI debates. 
77  Admissions Case [1950] ICJ 8.  Competence Case [1948] ICJ 63. 
78  Stone, above, 345 and also consider footnote 7a of his paper. 
79  G G Fitzmaurice (1956) 56 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international 317; F Jacobs "Varieties of 
Approach to Treaty Interpretation: with Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference" (1969) 18 ICLQ 318, 322. 
80  ILC Proceedings (1964) YBILC I 275-278, comments of Messrs Tunkin, Briggs, de Luna, Tabibi, 
Amado, Ruda and Rosenne.  [ILC Proceedings 1964] 
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B Work of the ILC 
1 1964 
Before considering the content of legal rules on interpretation, the ILC had to decide 
whether such rules were possible or desirable.81 The scepticism of the Harvard Draft, 
together with the strength of the debate between the schools made the question a real 
issue, and it clearly was an option to leave interpretation out of the eventual codification of 
the law of treaties.  Nevertheless, both the Special Rapporteur and the Commission came 
quite quickly to the conclusion that the various maxims often applied to interpretation, 
were not legal rules, but only potential aids and guides depending on a particular situation 
or text.82 They should therefore be excluded from any draft, even as mere examples of 
useful tools.83 However it should be possible and therefore desirable to identify the 
"comparatively few rules" constituting the "strictly legal basis" of interpretation",84 which 
is what the ILC set out to do. 
This approach seems uncontroversial today.  It recognises that interpretation is always 
a matter of addressing a particular case, albeit within some framework, but not of applying 
rigid grammatical rules to produce a mechanical answer.   This at least recognises the 
limits of textualism.  However, in taking this approach Sir Humphrey Waldock, and the 
Commission by adopting his words in slightly watered down form,85 based their 
argument on the need to reinforce or establish the importance of text.  Apart from the 
obvious point that some basic rules will help to avoid arbitrary interpretation, the other 
main reason given is the need to "take a clear position in regard to the role of the text", 
given "the tendency of doctrinal differences" to "weaken the significance of the text".86 
Even in deciding whether to have legal rules, battle lines were being drawn on the main 
doctrinal dispute between text and intentions. 
The question therefore becomes, did the ILC follow through from this reasoning, to 
propose an essentially textual answer to the question of the basis or purpose of treaty 
interpretation?  There seems little doubt the members were led to begin from this point by 
  
81  Sir H Waldock Third Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) YBILC II 
5, 53 para 1, 54 – 55, para 8 [Waldock Third Report]; ILC Proceedings 1964, above. 
82  Waldock Third Report, above, 54, para 6; ILC Commentary 1964, above, 200, para 5. 
83  Waldock Third Report, above, 54, para 8. 
84  Waldock Third Report, above; ILC Commentary 1964, above, 200, para 6. 
85  Waldock Third Report, above; ILC Commentary 1964, above. 
86  Waldock Third Report, above.   The ILC Commentary 1964, above, merely argues the desirability 
of taking a clear position on the text. 
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their Special Rapporteur.  Waldock's Third Report, while admitting the controversy, 
accepts the textual as the "majority" position, and explicitly promotes it as the resolution to 
the debate.87 He acknowledges the 1956 ILI articles and Fitzmaurice's six principles as 
"inspiration" in proposing the original drafts,88 which follow a clearly textual approach.  
Proposed article 70 (later proposed article 69) explicitly seeks to incorporate Fitzmaurice's 
first three and sixth principles (textuality, ordinary meaning, integration and 
contemporaneity ) - "the very essence of the textual approach" as well as the pacta sunt 
servanda principle of interpretation in good faith.89  For Waldock, the elucidation of the 
meaning of the text is both the "starting point" and "purpose" of interpretation.90 
Waldock's views clearly enjoyed support amongst members,91 as evidenced not least 
by their willingness to adopt much of the text of Waldock's report as their commentary 
with apparently minor amendments.92 One member explicitly referred to Vattel's basic 
rule,93 and the Chairman considered it was in fact implicit in the draft, although he would 
prefer not to lay "too much stress" on it.94 However it is clear from a reading of the 
Commission's first discussions on the draft articles that all of the major schools had some 
influence on at least some Commissioners' views.  Messrs Tabibi and Pessou were most 
explicit in stressing the primacy of the intentions of the parties,95 and Messrs Rosenne and 
Yasseen also stressed the importance of intentions, and the need to go beyond merely 
textual analysis.96 Mr Bartos on the other hand adopted the most obviously teleological 
approach, preferring to rely on the "spirit" and the objects and purposes of the treaty, 
considering they should be the basis of interpretation, not the text.97 Mr Briggs on the 
  
87  Waldock Third Report, above, 52- 61. 
88  Waldock Third Report, above, 55, para 10. 
89  Waldock Third Report, above, 56, para 14. 
90  Waldock Third Report, above, 56, para 13. 
91  See for example ILC Proceedings (1964) YBILC I 280, para 79, Chairman Ago, 277, para 36, Mr 
Ruda, 280, para 75-76, Mr Pal; and to a lesser extent Mr Rosenne, 278, para 40, Mr Briggs, 275, para 
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92  Compare Waldock Third Report, above, 53ff, paras 1-8, and ILC Commentary (1964) II YBILC 199 
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93  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 277, para 33, Mr Ruda. 
94  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 280, para 79. 
95  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 276, para 25, Mr Tabibi; 278, para 46. 
96  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 278, para 40, Mr Rosenne; 286, para 49, Mr Yasseen. 
97  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 279-280, paras 64, 67; 281, para 91. 
  
226 (2002) 33 VUWLR 
other hand appeared to adopt a cautiously "inclusive" approach, based loosely on the 
Harvard draft. 
Thus while Waldock continued to assume the Commission's "strong predilection for 
textual interpretation" at least in 1964,98 it can be seen that consideration and redrafting of 
the proposed articles involved a process of compromise and movement away from 
thoroughgoing textuality.  Reference to "natural" meaning was quickly dropped, and the 
"object and purpose" of the treaty was brought into paragraph 1, instead of the Third 
Report's proposed ancillary position.99 In addition, small but significant changes appeared 
in the commentary: references agreeing with "the primacy of the text" were toned down or 
disappeared,100 and while the text is still the starting point, it is no longer the starting point 
and purpose of interpretation.101 Similarly, in the discussion of the degree to which 
recourse could be had to supplementary means, a traditional battleground of the 
textual/intentions debate, there is evidence of some compromise, to lessen the effects of 
too strict a textual approach, by allowing recourse at any time to "confirm" a meaning.102 
Also, evidence of concordant subsequent practice is moved up to the first article, as a 
primary or authentic means of interpretation.103  Textuality retains explicit pride of place 
in the commentary, but it is clear that even in 1964 the Commission did not agree or intend 
a purely textual approach. 
The formula of elucidation of the meaning of the text as the "starting point for 
interpretation" is in fact remarkably close to Lauterpacht's proposed 1950 article.104 Here it 
is shorn of reference to the search for intentions as the "principal goal" for interpretation, 
and there is recognition that there is to be no ab initio investigation of parties' intentions.105  
However, given that the ILC is describing a starting point, not an endpoint, or indeed "the 
  
98  ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 314, para 71. 
99  See ILC Proceedings 1964, above, 275 para 11, Mr Brigg's objection; compare Sir H Waldock Third 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties to the ILC (1964) YBILC II 5, draft Article 70, 
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101 ILC Commentary 1964, above, 201, para 9. 
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105 ILC Commentary 1964, above, 201, para 9. 
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purpose" of interpretation, it is highly likely that even Lauterpacht could agree with the 
expression chosen.  By leaving out reference to overriding purpose, it appears the ILC was 
adopting exactly the approach to contentious issues which Lauterpacht had noted: the 
adoption of vague or ambiguous language, or the deletion of a difficult phrase, to cover a 
lack of actual agreement, common understanding or intention.106 Perhaps the most 
important conclusion which can be drawn from the 1964 deliberations of the ILC was that 
the members had no common intention on the fundamental purpose of treaty 
interpretation, and that therefore all their tentative conclusions on methods and sources 
were attempts to reach compromises that adherents of different approaches could agree 
with. 
2 1966 
In 1966, the ILC considered the responses of governments, and a further report from 
the Special Rapporteur.107 While the report detects "general endorsement" for the ILC-
proposed starting point from governments, it did note that there were government 
proponents, for either a more explicitly textual or an avowedly intentions purpose as the 
basis for interpretation.108 This suggests at least some states recognised that the ILC was 
fudging the basic issue, hoping for some workable compromise. 
Both the Sixth Report and the eventual commentary to the revised draft articles still 
appear strongly textual: The commentary to draft article 27109 largely repeats the 1964 logic 
making text the starting point, including Huber's comment quoted above.110 United States 
proposals to de-emphasise ordinary meaning, as just one of six factors were rejected,111 as 
were proposals from some states and several Commission members to raise preparatory 
works and other supplementary means to the status of primary means.112 It is therefore 
  
106 H Lauterpacht "Restrictive Interpretations and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation 
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not surprising that states tended to view the drafts as incorporating "the textual 
approach".113 
In reality the ILC further qualified the textual approach, to the point where it should be 
recognised as something different.  The Proceedings show that the members remained 
deeply divided.  The eventual compromise on article 28/32, on supplementary means, 
appears to be the most that a textually-inclined majority would accept, and the least that a 
strong minority could live with.114 A significant proportion of debating time was taken up 
with supplementary means, with the minority strongly advocating that the distinction 
between primary and secondary means be abolished, and/or that at least preparatory 
works be included in article 27/31.115 The debate can be seen as an analogue for one not 
explicitly held, over the basic purpose of interpretation. 
In the end, the minority appears to have given up a fight it could not win, but to have 
found more common ground with the Special Rapporteur in another area which helped to 
mitigate the loss.  This was on the critical issue of whether there was any hierarchy of 
means, or whether the process of interpretation was to be regarded as a "unity".  In 
response to United States and other state criticisms that the original drafts set up an 
inappropriate hierarchical system, with ordinary meaning pre-eminent, Waldock 
suggested that the ILC had never intended to set up a hierarchy: there was to be a general 
rule, not rules in priority order.  All the various elements would be thrown into the 
"crucible", in a "combined operation".116  
This crucible analogy was taken up with alacrity by the dissenters,117 and was 
confirmed in the commentary, where the unity of the process of interpretation was also 
stressed.118 This placing of all interpretative means in article 27/31 on a par significantly 
undermines any textual predominance in the general rule.  While the textualists can and 
did119 read references to context, object and purpose as to be found primarily from the text, 
such a reading is not self-evident from the text, and in any case the article now clearly 
  
113 Waldock Sixth Report, above, 91-93.  See for instance the views of Israel, and the United Kingdom. 
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118 Report of the International Law Commission on Draft Articles (1996) II YBILC 169, 220-221. [ILC 
Commentary 1966] 
119 ILC Proceedings 1966, above, 188, paras 38-39, Mr Reuter. 
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contained, on an equal footing in the "crucible" approach, explicit reference to special 
meaning intended by the parties, and concordant subsequent practice.120 Also, even the 
confirmed relegation of preparatory works and other "supplementary" means is modified, 
not only by the possibility of their "confirmatory" use, but also in the commentary, where 
the means in article 28/32 are brought within the "unity of the process of interpretation".121 
Given the now extensive resort to extrinsic means of interpretation – that is, from 
outside the actual text of the treaty – and the fact that the object and purpose of a treaty can 
be seen to be analogous to the intentions of its drafters, not a mere extrapolation from the 
text, it is clear that while interpretation is still to start from the text, as the most obvious 
place to look first, a wide range of sources and approaches can and should be used.  While 
the ILC remains studiously silent on the purpose of treaty interpretation, it must be said 
that the evolving approach of the draft articles is more consistent with as broad an enquiry 
as necessary to establish the will of the parties, rather than a simply linguistic exercise to 
clarify the meaning of a text.  No doubt the continued silence on this critical point of 
difference allowed the members to reach a text that all could accept, but both that text and 
the work behind it show permission, even encouragement, to depart from a textual 
approach. 
3 Relevance of the ILC's work 
The debate over the relative merits of different methods and sources for interpretation 
raises an issue about the relevance of the work of the ILC to our understanding of the law.  
What recourse should be had to the ILC work when interpreting articles 31 and 32? Clearly 
the Vienna Conference agreed the articles, not the ILC, albeit without significant 
amendment from the ILC drafts.122 Should we have reference to preparatory works to 
interpret articles 31 and 32? In any case, do the deliberations of the ILC amount to 
preparatory works? The ILC itself was alive to the last issue, and discussed it in 1966.123 
In the first place, it must be held that whatever position one takes on the appropriate 
approach to interpretation, the articles are ambiguous on their face and necessitate a wide 
  
120 Article 27/31, paras 3 (b) and 4. 
121 ILC Commentary 1966, above, 220, para 10. 
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recourse to other sources.  The meaning of "object and purpose" is ambiguous, as is the 
specific content of the good faith obligation.  It is not clear how in article 31(4) a special 
meaning is to be established: as this is a "primary" means of interpretation, does this imply 
one can always have recourse to the dealings of the parties to check for special meanings? 
Similarly the consequences of confirmatory resort to supplementary means are not clear: if 
they do not confirm but contradict an otherwise apparently "clear" meaning, do they have 
weight? 
In the light of such ambiguities, it is both necessary and desirable to refer to the ILC 
work.  The ILC accepted that their work could give insight into the intended meaning, 
especially where adopted unchanged.124 While it was possible for a conference to attribute 
a different meaning to the same text,125 the meaning intended by the ILC is relevant to 
interpretation.  Importantly, the ILC also recognised that it would be counter-productive to 
try to define preparatory works, as this might only lead to exclusion of relevant 
evidence.126 This confirms not only that the ILC work is an important source in 
understanding the content of the law, but also that the interpretation enquiry is a broad 
one.  The ILC's conceptualisation of a "crucible" is self-reinforcing.  Whatever position one 
takes on the apparent clarity or ambiguity of the text of the articles, the developed 
understanding of the ILC of the need to approach interpretation as an integrated, unified 
process should shape how the modern interpreter of any treaty approaches their task. 
C The Vienna Conference 
The Conference adopted the draft articles largely unchanged, by unanimous votes.127 
While this strengthens the importance of the ILC's work, it does not suggest a common 
understanding on what the articles meant.  Debate continued about the merits of different 
approaches,128 and states were divided on whether article 27 embedded textualism, or 
provided for parity of means.129 There was a similar split on article 28, on whether it 
allowed liberal or restricted access to supplementary means.130 The proportions are 
  
124 See ILC Proceedings 1966, above, 205, para 25, Chairman Yasseen. 
125 See ILC Proceedings 1966, above, 205, para 27, Mr Tunkin. 
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remarkably similar to those of the opposing views in the ILC, where perhaps five out of 18 
members adopted a consistently more "liberal" line.131  
It is suggested that states were as far from common intention on the basis or purpose of 
interpretation as the ILC.  Amendments from intentions or a textual perspectives were 
decisively voted down,132 suggesting no real agreement about what underpinned the 
articles.  The result has the appearance of delegates sticking to a workable compromise, 
fudging the difficult issue as did the ILC.  While it is probably true that most states thought 
they were adopting a textual approach, perhaps with reasonable scope to adopt other 
means, they specifically avoided saying so in the text.  The ILC draft can, in that sense, be 
seen as a work of some genius, as it allowed the parties, to reach agreement on a text, 
without first having to resolve the old doctrinal disputes.   
This leaves the implication that the relative claims of the schools remain inherent but 
unresolved in the wording, giving later interpreters opportunity to draw on the insights of 
the schools if they wish.  The extent to which this has occurred, and whether it has 
resolved anything about the nature of the law or its underpinnings, is examined in sections 
IV and V. 
IV ATTITUDES TO TREATY INTERPRETATION FROM 1969 
Whatever the intentions of the drafters, or the delegates at the conference, articles 31 
and 32 have usually been taken to require either the textual, or a closely related contextual 
approach.  State practice, academic writings, and to a lesser extent arbitral and judicial 
decisions tend to confirm this as the majority, but not the only, view.  Given this 
background, the attitude of the majority in the ICJ in the 1990's examined in section V 
below, is not surprising, but is rather a further step in an emerging predominance of 
textualism.  Whether this is predominance should be confirmed must be returned to later. 
A State Practice 
In the period following the Vienna Conference it is possible to detect conflicting views 
on the basis for interpretation.  The articles were already being referred to as reflecting 
custom,133 or being treated as declaratory of principles of international law.134 On the law's 
content, some governments stressed the importance of intentions.135 However, more 
  
131 ILC Proceedings (1966) I Pt II.  See especially 199-207, the debate on supplementary means. 
132 Villiger, above, 332. 
133 Villiger, above, 334, position of Austrian Government. 
134 Villiger, above, 335, position of Federal Republic of Germany; 335, position of Sweden. 
135 Villiger, above, 334 - 335, for instance, Germany and Belgium. 
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prevalent was the view that the articles embodied textuality.136 The United Kingdom 
courts have sometimes consciously adopted a teleological, or what they call the "European" 
approach, and have been arguably slow to recognise the convention rules.137 Nevertheless, 
it is easy to agree with Villiger that many states, by the 1980s, regarded the articles as 
declaratory, and considered they embodied the textual approach.138 The approach of the 
ILC appears eroded, in that article 31(1) alone appears often to be taken to be the "general 
rule", not the totality of article 31, and access to supplementary means is taken to be 
restrictive.139 No doubt state practice is not sufficiently uniform or widespread to amount 
to subsequent practice under article 31(3)(b), but paradoxically, it may amount to 
supplementary evidence admissible under article 32.  Of course, states adopting a textual 
reading of the articles may consider such evidence as unnecessary and inadmissible, if they 
consider the articles meaning is "clear". 
B Courts and Arbitral Tribunals 
Courts and tribunals have been more ambivalent about the basis for treaty 
interpretation, at least until the ICJ in the 1990s.  There was willingness to apply article 31's 
general rule even before its ratification, as representing "generally accepted principles of 
international law",140 or "traditional canons".141 However, different tribunals and judges 
have taken quite different approaches to what the articles require, indicating no early 
consensus on their meaning.  The European Court of Human Rights in Golder appeared to 
be adopting exactly the expressed reasoning of the ILC, that the general rule defines "the 
process of interpretation as a unity, a single combined operation", with all the elements of 
the article on an equal footing.142 While this suggests that the Court was adopting the 
implicit compromise between text and other means of interpretation proposed by the ILC, 
  
136 Villiger, above, 336, position of the United Kingdom Government in the Golder Case (1975) 57 ILR 
209 (ECHR).  As well as the United Kingdom, Villiger identifies Austria, Canada, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, South Africa, Switzerland, and even the United States as exhibiting at least some 
agreement that the textual approach predominates.   
137 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines (1980) 2 All ER 696 (CA); James Buchanan case (1977) 1 All ER 518 (CA); 
See Villiger, above, 337; see also R Gardiner "Treaty Interpretation in the English Courts since 
Fothergill v Monarch Airlines" (1995) 44 ICLQ 620. 
138 Villiger, above, 337, para 499. 
139 Villiger, above, 337, para 499. 
140 Golder Case (1975) 57 ILR 209 (ECHR), 213-214, para 29.  See discussion in Sir I Sinclair The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984) 131-133. 
141 Beagle Channel Arbitration (1979) 52 ILR 124, para 7(d)(i); Villiger, above, 339, para 503. 
142 Golder, above, 214, para 30. 
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Fitzmaurice and Verdross at the time,143 and Sinclair later144 were highly critical of the 
departure from an available ordinary meaning in favour of something incompatible with 
it.  While the disagreement appears to be a principled one based on the different 
perspectives of textualists and those prepared to adopt a more teleological approach, there 
is no doubt some plausibility in Sinclair's description of the Court's adherence to the 
articles as "lip service",145 and Fitzmaurice's accusation that the Court was in fact using the 
articles to confirm an interpretation reached by other means.146 That the dispute was 
possible emphasises the breadth of the articles, the lack of true consensus in their 
development, and the scope for ongoing divergence on their interpretation. 
Some early arbitral decisions do however suggest a more consistently textual approach.  
The Beagle Channel Arbitration, involving the interpretation of an 1881 boundary treaty 
between Argentina and Chile, was resolved on a textual analysis of "the more natural 
[meaning] on the basis of the actual language of the text".147 The Arbitral Tribunal in the 
Young Loan Arbitration actually applied the articles, moving from unclear text to context 
and objects and purposes, and on to preparatory works to resolve the question of what 
amounted to a "depreciation".148 However, as Villiger has pointed out, the panel may only 
have moved on to other means, because the text could not resolve the issue.149 The case 
does not stand for any clear acceptance of parity of means, even within article 31. 
The attitude of the ICJ to the articles during the 1970s and into the 80s seems at most 
ambivalent.  McDougall has criticised the Court for being overwhelmingly textual in its 
approach,150 while noting some exceptions from individual judges, such as Judges de 
Castro and Dillard in the Namibia Advisory Opinion.151 While McDougall's view is 
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144 See Sir I Sinclair The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2 ed, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984) 131-133. 
145 Sinclair, above, 131. 
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149 M Villiger Customary International Law and Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985) 341. 
150 M S McDougall, H D Lasswell and J C Miller The Interpretation of International Agreements and 
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (New Haven Press, New Haven, 1994 
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undoubtedly coloured by his view of the articles themselves, there is evidence of textual 
analysis in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,152 and in some of the separate opinions in the 
WHO Advisory Opinion.153  However, in a much quoted paragraph from the Namibia 
Advisory Opinion, the Court is "[m]indful … of the primary necessity of interpreting an 
instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion".154 
While the phrase is used in connection with settling a question of intertemporal law as it 
affects interpretation,155 it does suggest the Court still gave credence to the view that the 
primary object of interpretation is to establish intentions.  The wording contains no hint of 
Huber's stipulation, that that intention is to found in the expressed text. 
It can be inferred the Court was inclined to avoid difficult questions of interpretation, 
especially where they tended to divide the Court.   Thus, in the WHO Advisory Opinion, the 
Court redefined the question to be answered, thereby avoiding having to resolve the key 
issue of whether "revision" could include "termination".156 The Court was divided on the 
merits of purely textual interpretation, with at least three judges seeing the need to avoid 
"formalism", and to resolve the issue by reference to preparatory works.157 Thus, while a 
textual approach often appeared in the jurisprudence of the Court, it remained contested, 
and it was not until the 1990s that the Court felt able or obliged to state an approach based 
on primacy of text, formally linked to articles 31 and 32. 
C Academic Writers 
Modern academic writing usually either argues or assumes that the articles encapsulate 
a textual or contextual basis and approach.  This is frequently true of writers who clearly 
disagree with such an approach, for instance, McDougall,158 Haraszti.159 and 
  
152 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK/Iceland) (1973) ICJ 9 para 17.   
153 WHO Advisory Opinion (1980) ICJ 73, 128, separate opinion of Judge Mosler; 185, separate opinion 
of Judge Sette-Camara; McDougall, Lasswell, and Miller, above, xlii-xliii. 
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Yambrusic.160 Jacobs is far more sympathetic towards textualism.161 He saw the articles as 
hierarchical, with ordinary meaning and therefore text coming first.162  
Sinclair also appears to favour ordinary meaning.163 His position, and his view on the 
content of the articles seems closest to the kind of contextual synthesis proposed by 
McNair, to which Sinclair refers.164 Text in context, and in the light of object and purpose 
gathered from the text, are the basis of interpretation.165 The interpreter can and will have 
access at various times to all the potential sources and methods available within the 
articles, but must have regard to their respective weights, or place in a hierarchy.166 If this 
seems well removed from the advertent intention of the ILC, it nevertheless can be said to 
represent an "orthodox" position, more recently reflected in the ICJ. 
Standing out against such an orthodoxy is the position of Villiger.  He makes use both 
of the text of the articles, and the proceedings of the ILC to argue for a more permissive 
approach.  Ordinary meaning is both relative, and multiple, as article 31 itself implies.167 
All of the elements within article 31 are of potentially equal value for interpretation, and 
this was the explicit intention of the ILC as expounded in the "crucible" analogy.168 The 
parties to a dispute are intended to have liberal recourse to supplementary means, because 
they can be used at any time to confirm, or where there is ambiguity, which will be 
frequent or prevalent.169 The articles therefore provided a highly flexible range of 
possibilities, which nevertheless governments and courts have tended not to use, sticking 
to inappropriately narrow textualism.170 
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Villiger does not choose between the schools, or argue that the articles adopt one 
school.171 While he clearly considers elements of all three main schools are present in the 
articles, he does not identify a clear basis for interpretation, or have anything to say on the 
purpose.  This is unfortunate if unsurprising, given that his primary purpose when 
considering the articles is to examine an example of divergence between treaty law and 
emerging custom.172 It will be argued in the remaining two sections that disagreement on 
purpose is what continues to impede progress in our understanding of interpretation, and 
this critical issue needs to be addressed if any resolution is to be attempted. 
V THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AND INTERPRETATION IN THE 90S 
By the early 1990s therefore, there was increasingly widespread agreement that articles 
31 and 32 represented both the conventional and customary law on treaty interpretation.  
This usually but not universally accompanied a view that the articles demanded primarily 
a textual approach, with other means of interpretation available but subordinate to the text 
of a treaty and the ordinary meaning.  As will be seen from analysis of the cases, the ICJ 
finally adopted this orthodox approach, but not without critical dissents which drive us 
back to consider the basis of treaty interpretation.   
A Libya v Chad 
1 Background 
The Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad) (Libya v Chad) 
came before the ICJ in 1990, based on a Framework Agreement ("Accord-Cadre") between 
the parties of 1989.173 It concerned in the opinion of Chad a boundary dispute over an 
existing but disputed border between the countries, and in the opinion of Libya, a question 
of the extent of Libya's territorial rights to the south, as Libya contended there was no 
existing conventional boundary in the affected area.174 Chad relied mainly on a boundary 
argued to have been determined by the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness, 
between the United Kingdom of Libya and France in 1955 (the 1955 Treaty),175 although it 
did also argue in the alternative that the border could also be determined by reference to 
  
171 Although reference to "object and purpose" does permit teleology, and preparatory works, among 
others, are there to shed light on intentions: Villiger, above, 343, para 513; 345, para 517. 
172 Villiger, above, 342, paras 508-510.  His analysis is one case study in his larger work on the 
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173 Libya v Chad [1994] ICJ 6, 8-9, para 1. 
174 Libya v Chad, above, 12-14, para 17. 
175 France was the then colonial power responsible for the area that became the State of Chad, on 
independence in 1960 
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earlier treaties, if the Court did not accept its interpretation of the 1955 Treaty.176 Libya on 
the other hand interpreted the treaty as not agreeing or determining the frontier in the 
affected area, but only confirming other frontiers which had already been agreed, such as 
that between Libya and Tunisia, to Libya's west.177  
2 The issue 
The dispute therefore turned on interpretation of the 1955 Treaty, and in particular its 
article 3 and the relevant annexe 1.  The authoritative French text reads:178 
Les deux Haute Parties contractantes reconnaissent que les frontières séparant les territoires de 
la Tunisie, de l'Algérie, de l'Afrique occidentale française et de l'Afrique équatoriale française 
d'une part, du territoire de la Libye d'autre part, sont celles qui résultent des actes 
internationaux en vigueur à la date de la constitution du Royaume Uni de Libye, tels qu'ils 
sont définis dans l'échange de lettres ci-jointes (annexe I).  
The Court did in fact determine the matter on the basis of its interpretation of the 
treaty, in favour of the Chad interpretation, that the 1955 Treaty did indeed set all the 
frontiers, including between Libya and what is now Chad.179 This is not surprising: the 
text of the treaty is relatively straightforward, and is supported by the context of other 
articles in the treaty, which also suggest that it was an object of the treaty to set the 
frontier.180 The conclusion is also supported by reference to preparatory works, and by 
reference to the subsequent attitudes of the parties to their mutual frontier.181 
3 The court's approach to interpretation 
More interesting is the approach which the Court took to interpretation.  It finally and 
explicitly confirmed article 31 as mandatory, because it reflected customary international 
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law.182 However, it cited only paragraph 1 of the article, stated that "[i]nterpretation must 
be based above all on the text of the treaty", and agreed that preparatory works and 
circumstances of conclusion were potential supplementary means.183 The Court was 
therefore not only accepting the general consensus on the articles' status as custom but was 
also adopting the specifically textualist reading.  "Above all on the text" is surely more than 
the text as the logical "starting point", and the apparent limitation to only article 31(1) is a 
denial of the "crucible" of means in a unitary process.  Not only does this exclude means in 
paragraphs 2 to 4 intended to be equally important in the mix, it leads as well to a 
narrowly textual application of the means in paragraph one.  This can be demonstrated by 
reference to the Court's own process of interpretation in this case. 
The Court rejects the Libyan interpretation, that article 3 intended only to recognise 
frontiers already fixed by the previous instruments, as contrary to the "natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words.184 While the Libyan contention is hard to defend, so too is 
this easy reliance on "natural meaning".  The Court no doubt felt they were dealing with an 
easy case, but to revert to locating "natural" meanings is arguably to resort to fictions. 
With respect to object and purpose, it is clear that the Court is limiting itself to locating 
these from the text of the treaty: One is to "read the 1955 Treaty in the light of its object and 
purpose".185 While this is certainly one important way to discern purpose, it begs the 
question of whether it is permissible to look elsewhere, to clarify purpose.  The Court 
seems to be implicitly accepting that it is not. 
The Court does several times refer to the intention of the parties.186 However it is clear 
that the Court is restricting itself to the Huber formula: it is the "manifest intention", and 
"the text [which] … conveys the intention".187 Intention, as with the related concept of 
purpose is relevant to the extent it can be located in the text. 
Much of the interpretation analysis concentrates on matters of grammar and semantics: 
For instance, the meaning and implications of "recognise", the significance of reference to 
"frontiers", not "the frontier", and the meaning of "en vigueur".188 This was probably in 
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part a response to the arguments put to it, especially by Libya,189 and is in any case 
inevitable to some extent, given that the words of the text and their relationships to each 
other are the logical starting point.   However, it can be inferred that the Court was 
comfortable with this as their principal tool of interpretation, and optimistic about its 
sufficiency.  In this case it no doubt was, but its limitations could easily be exposed in more 
difficult cases.190 
The treatment allotted to subsequent practice is illuminating.  The Court does not deal 
with this as a means of interpretation in its primary interpretation of the treaty, or indeed 
until after it has identified the boundary arising from the annexed conventions.  While it 
details a series of agreements after 1955 and other statements and actions, this is done as an 
apparently confirmatory analysis of "subsequent attitudes", not practice.191 While this may 
have been due to the way the case was argued, or because the Court did not consider the 
practice came within the definition in article 31(3)(b), the possibility is not even raised.  
This again suggests the text trumps other means, even those placed on a par with them, by 
article 31. 
4 Separate opinion of Judge Ajibola 
The narrow textual approach of the majority is in contrast to the more wide-ranging 
interpretation provided by Judge Ajibola.  While Judge Ajibola considers the majority 
"dealt adequately" with the interpretation of article 3,192 he adds a considerably more 
detailed analysis, highlighting the equal importance of "actual object and purpose",193 the 
possibility of an "integration approach" which may help reveal the intentions of the 
parties,194 and the relevance of subsequent practice.195 While Judge Ajibola does not come 
to any different conclusions from the majority, and also seeks to ground his approach in 
the provisions of articles 31 and 32,196 he demonstrates that it is not necessary or advisable 
to stop at the text.  This once again confirms the ambiguity of the articles.  His approach is 
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closer to the crucible advocated by the ILC and further suggests that the textual approach 
of the Court's judgment will have its limitations when it faces more difficult problems. 
5 Summary: A wrong turn? 
It is unfortunate that the Court chose to define its position on treaty interpretation and 
the content of articles 31 and 32 in such a straightforward case.  The relative ease with 
which mainly textual analysis resolves the issue in the present case masks that this will not 
always be so.  By adopting the textual approach as mandatory the Court has developed the 
law without fully testing its implications.  It will be seen in the case of Qatar v Bahrain that 
too-ready reliance on textual analysis can not only lead to inappropriate conclusions, but 
may also serve as a shield or device, to provide a basis for an interpretation arguably 
arrived at by other means, or for other reasons. 
B Qatar v Bahrain 1995 
1 Background 
The Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain had its roots long before 1971, when the two states gained full independence.197 
The subject matter concerned land on the Qatar peninsula (Zubarah) claimed by Bahrain, 
islands off the coast of Qatar held by Bahrain and claimed by Qatar (Hawar Islands and 
Janan Island), various low tide elevations in the sea between the two states, and the 
maritime boundaries, once all the territorial claims had been settled.198 The Court released 
its judgment on the substantive case in April 2001,199 which is of no special interest for 
treaty interpretation.  The case relevant here is the 1995 Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
decision,200 which turned on a contentious interpretation issue relating to the 
"international agreements" between Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (as neutral mediator) 
which aimed at settling the dispute by submitting the whole of it to the ICJ.  The relevant 
agreements consisted of identical letters sent by the King of Saudi Arabia in December 
1987 to each party, and the so-called "Doha Minutes" of December 1990.  The first 
"agreement" put in train negotiations to conclude a Special Agreement for submission to 
the Court, which had stalled by late 1988.201  The Doha Minutes, the record of a meeting in 
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Doha attended by the parties and the King of Saudi Arabia and signed by the parties, 
agreed critically in paragraph 2:202 
The good offices of … King Fahd … shall continue … to May 1991.  Once that period has 
elapsed the two parties [alternatively 'the parties'] may submit the matter to the International 
Court of Justice in accordance with the Bahraini formula, which has been accepted by Qatar, 
and with the procedures consequent on it.  The good offices of … Saudi Arabia will continue 
during the period the matter is under arbitration. 
2 The issue in 1995 
The critical question for the 1995 case became, did this provision entitle one party to 
unilaterally refer the dispute to the Court, after May 1991, or would there still need to be 
either a special agreement or separate but identical applications?203 
Qatar took the former view, and submitted an application in July 1991.  The Court 
found in July 1994 that the 1987 and 1990 agreements did together constitute international 
agreements creating binding obligations, by which the parties had undertaken to submit 
the dispute to the Court.  However, as there was as yet only one application, the Court 
would give the parties opportunity to submit to it "the whole of the dispute".204 In the 
event the parties could not agree on how to do this, and Qatar once again made its own 
application, which was duly challenged by Bahrain.205 
3 The reasoning of the majority 
Thus the Court, having once given the parties another chance to resolve the jurisdiction 
and seisin issue, was forced to decide whether, based on the earlier agreements it had 
found, Qatar could in fact unilaterally seise the Court.   It found by a majority of 10 to 5 
that it could, based on the interpretation it gave to the critical paragraph 2.  It stated that it 
reached this conclusion "based on the ordinary meaning to be given to [the Minute's] terms 
in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the said Minutes".206 The 
Court was clearly once again adopting its minimalist, textual version of Article 31.  
  
202 Qatar v Bahrain 2001, above, 17, para 30. 
203 Qatar v Bahrain 2001, above, 18, para 32. 
204 Qatar v Bahrain 2001, above, 9, para 9. 
205 Qatar v Bahrain 2001, above, 9-10, paras 12-13.  The apparent difference between the parties was 
how to describe elements of the main dispute:  Bahrain insisted on the disputes over Zubarah and 
the Hawar Islands being described as "claims of sovereignty".  In its application Qatar merely 
noted that this was how Bahrain defined its claim over Zubarah. 
206 Qatar v Bahrain 2001, above, 21, para 40. 
  
242 (2002) 33 VUWLR 
Examination of the Court's reasoning shows it overwhelmingly textual, of questionable 
logic, and inappropriate given the evidence.   
The Court began by quoting its summary of the required approach to interpretation 
from Libya v Chad.207 It then looked at the critical expression "al-tarafan"("the parties or "the 
two parties").  It acknowledged the ambiguity, over whether this implied joint or unilateral 
referral, and sought to resolve it by reference to the context in which it was used.208 
Context is however to be used cautiously; the Court refers to the "more immediate" and 
"more remote" context, and clearly prefers the former.209 
The Court relies on the fact that "the two parties may submit …".  It holds that "may" 
implies, in its most ordinary or natural sense "a possibility or even a right", which therefore 
suggests an option or right to seise the Court, and to be able to do this unilaterally.210 This 
is an enormous leap in logic.  While "may" does suggest possibility rather than obligation, 
there is nothing in the word or its use to suggest that rights attach severally.  It is surely 
more "natural" to read the words to say that the two parties may submit their case 
together, or to accept at the very least that the word may does not clarify one way or the 
other, whether either can or both must.  The Court already appears to be drawing 
unwarranted conclusions from the language used, which are even more dubious when 
related to the preparatory works, discussed below. 
The Court bolsters its conclusion by reference to the phrase "once that period had 
elapsed", suggesting that the "right" was capable of being exercised as soon as the required 
five months of mediation had elapsed, which necessarily, for the Court implied the right 
had to be to unilateral seisin, to be effective.211 This is an invocation of the principle of 
effectiveness, and is driven by the Court's view of the object and purpose of the Doha 
Minutes: The advancement of the settlement of the dispute by facilitating its referral to the 
Court.212 This is problematic, as Lauterpacht has shown,213 as it need not be assumed that 
the parties, or their agreement had as their object, referral at any cost or by any means.  The 
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principle allows treaties to have appropriate effects, and given the long and difficult 
negotiating history, where both parties jealously guarded their positions on procedural as 
well as substantive matters, it is hard to accept that the parties now anticipated unilateral 
seisin, in the absence of agreement on the issues.  The Court is arguably assuming an object 
and purpose which provides for the greatest effect by the treaty, not necessarily the most 
appropriate.  If the purpose is read less ambitiously, the phrase "once the period has 
elapsed" does nothing to strengthen any implication of unilateral seisin, but rather merely 
highlights that no seisin was possible before the new period had expired.  While 
apparently attempting to read words in context, the Court is in reality in danger of 
amending the treaty. 
The Court also relies on the "good offices" provision to reinforce its analysis.  It 
suggests that, as the words might suggest that the intended good offices could not begin 
again, after the five months, until the matter was in arbitration, and it would be 
undesirable ("contrary to purpose") to have this mediation suspended, there must have 
been provision for immediate and unilateral seisin.214 The Court appears to recognise this 
argument is weak, as it stresses that, even if it is wrong on the implications for mediation 
of the final sentence in paragraph 2, its earlier reasoning still holds.215 While the reasoning 
here does not therefore carry much weight, it can be seen in any case that it rests again on 
the purpose assumed by the Court.  In any case, it can be argued from the developments in 
interpretation discussed in section VI below that this is the sort of situation where a court 
may need to recognise that wrong or infelicitous language has been used, and therefore be 
slow to accept an implication that may flow from such words.216 The wording therefore 
does not support the Court's conclusion. 
To make its conclusion work, the Court has to read down the reference to the "Bahraini 
formula … and with the procedures consequent on it".  On its face, paragraph 2 indicates 
any referral must be in accordance with the formula.  Arguably, given the context in which 
the formula was developed in 1988 and the words of its preamble, this would imply joint 
referral.  Such an implication is strengthened by the "and the procedures consequent" 
stipulation – if the formula anticipated or required joint referral, that would be the 
procedure required as consequent on it.217  The Court dealt with this problem for its 
conclusion by effectively reading the formula as being used in 1990 to define only the 
subject matter of the dispute.  It justified this by suggesting the formula needed to be 
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understood in its 1990 context – as a way of settling the subject matter – rather than in its 
1988 context.218 It therefore managed to suggest that only procedural consequences that 
survived the change of context were relevant – not the procedural consequences 
anticipated in 1988 as a result of the formula.219 
The logical and inferential leaps of this reasoning are breathtaking.  No evidence – from 
the text or anywhere else - is presented to support the contention that only the subject 
matter was being invoked, and the arguable counter-indications in the text are ignored.220 
The Court appears prepared to do violence to textual analysis, to preserve an 
interpretation which it favours.  While the Court will not consider it is doing so, as it 
clearly considers it has arrived at the ordinary and "clear" meaning of the text, the situation 
does show the inherent limitations of the textual approach as a method, and therefore as 
the purpose of interpretation: The text is at best ambiguous or contradictory, if viewed 
from the Court's perspective, and cannot be a complete answer to the interpretation 
question – even with the aid of treaty purpose, inferred from the text. 
The interpretation is in fact so tenuous that it suggests the Court may have merely been 
using textual devices to achieve an end it saw as desirable for other reasons, just as 
Lauterpacht had suggested Courts could and did, when applying "rules".221 It can be 
argued here that what the Court is achieving is what it sees as the equitable and desirable 
result, despite the difficulties with interpretation: desirable as it should help to move 
toward settlement an intractable dispute which has the potential for violence; equitable 
because while it allows Qatar to achieve unilateral seisin, it does so in a format which 
broadly meets apparent Bahraini concerns over subject matter, and allows the Court to 
specifically state that the remaining concerns, specifically claims of sovereignty, will fall 
within the dispute.222 While there is no direct appeal to equity, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the Court felt it was achieving a "fair" result, and that its approach to 
interpretation could support that.223 The willingness to go to the fair result points to the 
conceptual poverty of the majority's approach to interpretation, which is drawn out in the 
dissenting opinions discussed below, and will be commented on further in section VI. 
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Despite all the interpretative difficulties it has picked its way through, the Court 
considers that it has arrived at a satisfactory ordinary meaning in terms of article 31(1), and 
that therefore reference to supplementary means is therefore strictly unnecessary.224 
Although it goes on to consider preparatory works, to help confirm its conclusions,225 the 
Court's position implies a very narrow view of the role of such means.  The Court 
apparently considers that, despite the evident ambiguity, it has been resolved and the 
meaning is not left "ambiguous or obscure",226 meaning reference is not required.  It would 
seem far better, and in keeping with a reasonable textual approach, to have recognised that 
while the Court preferred one meaning, ambiguity remained, and other sources could and 
should be used to resolve it. 
The Court's treatment of the preparatory works is unconvincing and misconceived.  It 
approaches them with caution because of their "fragmentary" nature,227 but does note the 
crucial fact that an earlier draft of paragraph two provided "either of the two parties", but 
that this was removed at the insistence of Bahrain.228 While noting this earlier version 
would clearly have provided for unilateral seisin, the Court argued that its removal does 
not demonstrate the opposite conclusion.229 While this may be arguable from a strictly 
logical viewpoint, it is surely contrary to a textual approach to argue that a change in 
wording does not mean something.  Even more importantly, given that preparatory works 
are used to establish the intention of the parties when it is not otherwise evident,230 it must 
be concluded that, either the parties did not agree or commonly intend unilateral seisin, or 
at least that Bahrain did not so intend, and at the very least Qatar ought to have known 
this.  The requirement for interpretation in good faith should surely mean that Qatar could 
not rely on its "interpretation".  Alternatively, it will be argued in the final section, this 
change should be taken to indicate, either that the parties had agreed a "special meaning" 
for al –tarafan, or that the "objective" intention of the parties was that unilateral seisin be 
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excluded.  Whichever method is adopted, it is submitted that the Court's failure to give 
any weight at all is unsustainable. 
4 Dissenting opinions 
Not surprisingly, the Court's judgment was subject to vigorous dissent.  Not all of the 
five dissenters concentrated on the interpretation weaknesses.231 However, Judge 
Shahabuddeen pointed out the weakness of the Court's reading down of the reference to 
the Bahraini formula,232 and he and others pointed to the real difficulties with the Court's 
analysis of the preparatory works, and the earlier version of "either of the parties".233 
Interestingly, Judge Shahabuddeen was prepared to say the meaning of the text was 
"clear",234 on the basis of his reading of the reference to the formula.  This demonstrates the 
unavoidable shortcoming of the textual approach: different readers will often arrive at 
quite different, often directly opposed but allegedly "clear" meanings.  Surely the better 
position is to accept that "clear" meanings are too frequently illusory, and that it will be 
better to accept the prevalence of ambiguity, and use all available means find what can 
often only be the "most likely" or "most appropriate" meaning in the circumstances. 
It is not altogether clear that the dissenting judges all want to severely qualify the 
textual approach of the majority, although all are prepared to use a wider range of means 
to resolve the central ambiguity.  Vice President Schwebel however goes much further, and 
brings the debate back to the fundamental issue of the true basis or purpose of 
interpretation.  He first refers to Lord McNair to establish that the ultimate goal is to give 
effect to the intention of the parties, that is, in Schwebel's words "the common intention of 
both parties".235 He then refers to numerous passages from the ILC proceedings to 
demonstrate the importance of establishing intentions, and the utility of preparatory works 
for doing so.236 He also points out that no-one in the case had even questioned the resort to 
preparatory works, or criticised them as "fragmentary, inconclusive, or otherwise open to 
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discounting or disregard".237 His central point is that all methods of interpretation, 
including textual analysis, should have as their central aim the finding of and giving effect 
to actual joint intentions.  Nothing which assists in this should be neglected, and 
limitations which get in the way of it are inappropriate.  In drawing so heavily on the ILC, 
he also appears to be implicitly assuming that this approach is consistent with articles 31 
and 32. 
It is significant that for Schwebel, it is enough that examination of the preparatory 
works demonstrates that unilateral seisin cannot have been a "common" intention.238 This 
shows the object of the Minutes cannot have been to allow unilateral seisin, as there could 
be no such purpose without common intention.  The Court's interpretation therefore falls 
outside the Vienna Convention rules, as it cannot be "in good faith".239 Thus, the analysis 
helps to demonstrate that the intentions of the parties can be relevant, even where they are 
not common, at least in a negative way.  While this does not completely remove the 
objection to the intentions school, that giving effect to intentions often means making them 
up, it does confirm that actual common intentions should be decisive, and that even where 
they are absent, an understanding of what intentions there are can still be of assistance.  
The scope for re-integrating intentions back into the process of interpretation will be 
discussed further in section VI. 
5 Summary 
Qatar v Bahrain not only demonstrates limitations and dangers in the regime for 
interpretation espoused in Libya v Chad. it also suggests some lines of enquiry to effect 
corrections.  It is likely that such corrections will include establishing a clearer and agreed 
basis for interpretation, and allowing the appropriate recognition of the intentions of the 
parties, whether common or divergent.  It is submitted that such corrections are far more 
likely to provide certainty in interpretation, than the approach of the majority in this case, 
which can best be described as arbitrary.240 
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As disagreements over interpretation seem likely to continue, it is now timely to see 
whether the opposing approaches can be integrated to form a more viable process.  
Modern thinking about the approach to contract interpretation can help show one possible 
solution. 
VI THE MODERN THEORY OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, AND 
TREATIES 
It is permissible and sensible to look to commercial contract law for answers on this 
subject.  While the subject matter of treaties and commercial contracts are vastly different, 
they are both laid on the same foundation of consensual agreement to be bound to legal 
obligations.  Given the consensual basis of all International Law, and especially of Treaty 
Law, it is logical to look to a parallel system equally based on voluntary assumption of 
obligations requiring a meeting of minds.  Furthermore, it is evident that the law of treaty 
interpretation has frequently "borrow[ed] … from the private law of contract".241 This has 
usually been to gather logical maxims and tools of interpretation, such as ejusdem generis or 
a contrario, which are of course not legal rules.242 However, this does not destroy the 
power of the analogy.  Contract law would no doubt agree with international, that these 
are useful guides, not rules of law.  More importantly, if contract law has faced the same 
controversies, over the dominance of "plain meaning", and the relative weight and 
admissibility of different types of evidence,243 and has found better ways to resolve them, 
then it is surely sensible for interpreters of treaties to see what can be transmitted from 
interpretation of contracts. 
A The Plain Meaning Rule and Emerging Ideas 
Anglo-Saxon, and especially British Commonwealth, contract law has traditionally 
held to a "Plain Meaning Rule" of contract interpretation.  The parallels with the classic 
textual position in treaty interpretation can be seen in a New Zealand expression of the 
rule:244 
[W]here words or a clause or indeed a contract as a whole have a clear objectively 
ascertainable meaning on the face of the document, then that is the meaning which the parties 
will be held to have intended and to which they shall be bound … On the other hand where a 
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word or a clause or indeed a whole contract is ambiguous or the result of a literal construction 
gives rise objectively to ambiguity or absurdity then the authorities allow the true intention to 
be elucidated by the admission of evidence directed to that end. 
Thus, while as with treaties under the textual approach, the intentions of the parties are 
theoretically important, a "clear", "plain" or "ordinary" meaning in the context of the 
contract, may give rise to an unrebuttable presumption that that is what the parties 
intended, and any diverging actual intention is irrelevant.  In this strict form, extrinsic 
evidence may not be admitted to demonstrate the ambiguity or absurdity, if it is not 
apparent on the face.245 
Such a stern view is usually justified by its defenders on the basis of certainty, the need 
for objectivity, and reasons of convenience or expedience.246 Such arguments have drawn 
criticism when used in defence of textualism in treaty interpretation, and the Plain 
Meaning Rule has been subject to vigorous academic criticism,247 and judicial retreat, to 
the extent that it can probably no longer be said to represent the law in the United 
Kingdom or New Zealand.248  
Professor McLauchlan bases his critique on a more realistic understanding of the 
uncertainty of language, the narrow scope and lack of legal quality in the so-called parol 
evidence rule, and a more cautious approach to the objective theory of contract.249 While 
the parol evidence rule, which states that recourse to extrinsic evidence is impermissible if 
it would contradict, add to, or vary an apparently complete written contract,250 can be 
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treated as peculiar to contract law, and never part of the International Law of Treaties,251 
the other two factors can be seen as highly relevant to interpretation of treaties. 
Professor McLauchlan asserts, with Corbin, Holmes and others,252 that it is a mistake to 
regard words as having "fixed" or "natural" meaning, but rather they are given meaning by 
the hearer or reader, or by the speaker or writer.253 It follows that it is possible, indeed 
desirable, to select the meaning the parties actually attached to the words used, or where 
they attached different meanings, that meaning which was held by one party and known 
to the other, rather than the apparently "plain" but different meaning contained in a 
document.254 This is not to deny that words and phrases will often have apparently plain 
or ordinary meanings.  Where they do, this will be strong, but not conclusive evidence that 
this was the meaning adopted by the parties.  But where there is convincing evidence that 
the parties actually meant something else, why should a court hold them to a meaning that 
neither intended?255 In treaty terms, such would be contrary to pacta sunt servanda and 
good faith. 
The need to move away from a too ready acceptance of a "plain" meaning has been 
recognised by the courts, in particular in the shape of five principles developed by Lord 
Hoffmann in the ICS case.256 The principles hold that it is always appropriate to consider 
all the relevant background, when seeking to arrive, objectively, at the meaning of a 
document, that is, whether or not there is any apparent ambiguity.  The relevant 
background is very widely defined, except for Lord Hoffmann it still does not include the 
negotiations of the parties, or their declarations of subjective intent.  It is important that the 
focus be on documents, not words: In some cases the background may actually establish 
that, for some reason, the parties used the wrong words or syntax.  The plain meaning rule 
is therefore reduced to an evidentiary presumption, that we do not lightly accept that 
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parties have made linguistic mistakes, or that for some other reason, the apparent meaning 
is not in fact the meaning of the parties.257 
The Hoffmann principles establish the first part of Professor McLauchlan's thesis, that 
an apparently plain meaning is rebuttable by other evidence.  They continue to rely on an 
objective theory however, that objective not actual intentions of the parties are what is 
being sought.258 As Professor McLauchlan has pointed out,259 such reluctance is not 
reflected outside the British Commonwealth.  The American Restatement provides for 
interpretation according to the actual common intention, or where intentions diverge, the 
intention of one party when the other party knew or ought to have known of it.260 This 
position is also adopted in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods,261 and in the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, effectively a restatement of the commercial contract law of the world.262 The 
common sense position, that we should interpret in accordance with the actual intentions 
of the parties when we know them, and not limit our resources when trying to establish 
such intention, is therefore increasingly widely accepted on an international level, at least 
in respect of contracts.  This begs the question, why a similar approach should not apply 
with treaties, where the emphasis on consent of the parties is arguably even stronger. 
It should be pointed out that this position is not in reality a retreat to subjectivity.  
While that which is being referred to can be described as the "subjective intentions of the 
parties", it is just as easily and more accurately described as their "actual intentions".263 
Any alleged actual intention has to be subject to objective evidence.  Interpreters do not 
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need to delve into "unfathomable depths of subjective intentions".264  Rather they will need 
to consider what reliable evidence (more than mere assertion) is available to point to 
intention.  It can be said that the label "subjective" is more an epithet useful to cast doubt 
on a necessary enquiry, than it is a statement of any real objection. 
B Implications for Treaty Interpretation: A Synthesis? 
The law of treaty interpretation has not been so restrictive as the strict form of the Plain 
Meaning Rule, described above, at least since the codification of articles 31 and 32.  Article 
31 not only allows, but according to the ILC requires resort to extrinsic evidence, through 
paragraph 31(3) and presumably paragraph (4).265  It is clear from the ILC Commentary 
and article 31 itself that the primary recourse to subsequent practice is limited to 
concordant practice.  Such recourse cannot logically be denied, as it represents a 
consensual agreement of the law.266 However the provision at least avoids the blanket ban 
which the Plain Meaning Rule imposes, and confirms that in this fact situation at least the 
actual intentions of the parties – what they agreed – should be decisive.  It is notable that 
the Court, in Kasikili Island clearly felt obliged to examine subsequent practice, even though 
it considered it had found the ordinary meaning.267  The unavoidable inference is that 
common intentions can and should be decisive, even potentially when they may appear to 
contradict an apparent "ordinary meaning".  Similarly, while the ILC considered resort to a 
special meaning was likely to be rare, and the textualists argued that the special meaning 
would or should appear as the ordinary meaning from the text or context,268 it was 
recognised by others that it would be impossible to establish special meanings without 
recourse to extrinsic means.269 The decision to keep the "special meaning" provision in 
article 31, rather than placing it as a subordinate or supplementary article, or deleting it 
altogether, implies an acceptance that an actual common agreement on meaning should be 
determinative, when it can be proven.  Thus article 31 is not a strict plain meaning rule, 
despite the apparent attitude of the Court, in Libya v Chad, and Qatar v Bahrain.   
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Despite this potential permissiveness, treaty interpretation can still learn and adopt 
much from the emerging modern understanding of contract interpretation.  The old 
contest between text and intentions can be resolved, not by enshrining one view or the 
other, but by according each its appropriate place.  Treaty interpretation should no longer 
be seen as a field of battle between two main but opposing schools of thought, but rather 
as an area of broad enquiry, where insights from the schools can be brought into harmony, 
so that each supports an ultimate goal, of more certain interpretations which are the most 
likely to be in accordance with the will of the parties. 
It is submitted that we should accept that the goal or object of treaty interpretation, is to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties.270 This means that, while we can still accept 
Judge Huber's precept,271 at least as a rebuttable presumption of fact, an apparently plain 
or ordinary meaning will merely be strong evidence that that is the meaning the parties 
intended.272 If, however, some other evidence offers convincing proof that the actual 
intention of the parties requires a different meaning or result, then that meaning should be 
preferred, in accordance with the basic purpose, and to comply with considerations of 
good faith.  Thus, the text remains the starting point but not necessarily the determinant of 
analysis.    
This approach may in some circumstances lead to a special meaning in terms of article 
31(4), but it will be wider than that limited or special case.  For instance, it may be 
necessary or possible to give a word or phrase a particular interpretation, to accord with 
the known overall actual intention of the parties, even though the parties never turned 
their mind to the meaning of the particular words, or how they should be interpreted in a 
new, previously unforeseen situation.   There will no doubt continue to be numerous 
situations where the ascertainable intentions of the parties add nothing, or are irrelevant 
because the parties have simply not turned their minds to the possibility which has 
subsequently arisen, and this case is dealt with below.   However, the intentions of the 
parties may still in some cases cast light, at least by inference, on how an unforeseen 
problem or circumstance should be approached, and it would once again be contrary to 
good faith to ignore any such insight. 
There will also be the situation highlighted by Lord Hoffmann, where the parties had a 
clear intention, but inadvertently used wrong or misleading words or syntax.273 An 
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example of such a situation is provided in Qatar v Bahrain, and gives the answer to the 
majority's somewhat strained attempt to support its main reasoning by reference to the 
words relating to the continuation of Saudi Arabia's "good offices".274 It is surely an 
unwarranted inference, to insist on a literal interpretation of some ancillary but poorly 
worded or conceived phrase, thus affecting the interpretation of more central treaty 
provisions, when it is clear from the context or other clues that the parties' intentions were 
quite contrary to such an interpretation.  Arguably, Lord Hoffmann's recognition that we 
sometimes do not have to, or cannot give a meaning or a consistent interpretation to every 
word used, is the key to unlocking overly formalistic approaches to interpretation, and 
thus arriving at the most appropriate understanding of a treaty.  Finally, It may often be a 
case of choosing between two or more potential meanings, each of which could be the 
"ordinary meaning", based on which better fulfils the intentions of the parties.  Once again, 
this can be argued to be the situation the Court faced (but attacked rather differently) in 
Qatar v Bahrain, when dealing with al-tarafan, and the related words.275 
In some circumstances it may be clear that, while it cannot be established that both 
parties shared the same intention, one party intended a particular meaning, and this 
intention was known to the other.  Following the contract principles, this meaning should 
be taken to be the objective intention of the parties.  If only by silence, a party may have 
reasonably led the other to believe that their meaning was accepted, and should not later 
be able to argue a different meaning.  It might be argued this approach diverges somewhat 
from the consensual basis of international law: One party's intended meaning is being 
favoured, not the meaning consensually agreed between the two.  However it is submitted 
that such a response is in fact both permissible and required.  To allow a party to resile 
from a meaning they can be argued to have tacitly accepted, or at least by omission 
encouraged another party to believe they accepted, would not only be contrary to the 
objective theory, in contract terms, but would also be contrary to the obligation of good 
faith, in treaty terms.  Such a result would be destructive of pacta sunt servanda, and 
encourages exactly the kind of unreasonable result reached in Qatar v Bahrain.276 In any 
case, there is surely a good evidentiary case accepting that a party accepts or agrees to a 
meaning placed on a provision by another party, if they know the meaning which is being 
ascribed, and take no action to dispute it.  At the very least this is strong objective evidence 
that such a known meaning is in fact the one intended by the parties. 
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If no common intention can be established, for any of the five reasons given by 
Lauterpacht,277 then it is submitted the most reasonable meaning based on all the 
circumstances should be chosen.  In such a situation, the words of the text, in context, may 
in fact be all that the interpreter has to work with, and in any case will carry very strong 
evidentiary value.  Given the large number of cases, where parties simply will not have 
turned their mind to an issue, or where new circumstances arise, and common intentions 
which are known cast no light, this may well remain the most common situation.  The 
above approach, however, simply adds to this normal situation, that the interpreter should 
not ignore the actual or objective (as opposed to implied or presumed) intentions of the 
parties, where these are available or can be ascertained by enquiry.  Just because a textual 
or contextual enquiry will sometimes, even often, be all that is realistically available to the 
interpreter, this provides no justification for ignoring other or stronger evidence of the will 
of the parties, where it is available. 
The natural corollary of this approach is that no potential source of evidence should be 
excluded if it will provide proof of intentions and therefore, the parties' meaning.  The 
relative weight of different types of evidence will still need to be considered, and it will of 
course take clear contradictory evidence to overturn an apparently clear meaning. 
It must be emphasised that the approach just suggested above is not the replacement of 
the textual approach with the intentions of the parties school.  It does not require or allow 
resort to "implied intentions" to fill every gap left in the actual intentions of the parties.  
Where common or objective intention is not ascertainable, there is no benefit in choosing a 
meaning, and then attributing that as the supposed intention of the parties.  It is surely far 
better to recognise that intention can only go so far, and that where it does not assist, we 
should look for the most reasonable interpretation.   
C Merits of the Proposed Approach 
It is submitted that the above approach is more consistent with the basic principles of 
pacta sunt servanda, and interpretation in good faith, than either the textual or the thorough-
going intentions approach.  It seems beyond argument that good faith requires us to 
choose an interpretation which we know represents the will of the parties, over one which 
can be justified only by a purely linguistic analysis as an ordinary meaning.  Similarly, the 
limitations on intentions, to prevent them being created by the interpreter to fill gaps, 
reinforces the focus on the treaty itself – and the will of the parties - rather than on the 
mind of the interpreter. 
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This approach should help avoid at least some arbitrary or unjustified interpretations, 
and assist interpreters to arrive more readily at agreed interpretations.  Reference to the 
cases discussed in section V above is instructive.  In Libya v Chad, the above approach 
would probably have made no difference to the result.  The textual and extrinsic evidence 
both led to the same conclusion, that is that the parties did intend to fix the border, and did 
so according to the 1919 Franco-British Agreement.278 By contrast, it is submitted that it 
would have been impossible for the majority to reach the same conclusion in Qatar v 
Bahrain.  Given the evidence of the preparatory works, it would surely have been difficult 
to avoid the conclusion either that the parties did share a common intention, that unilateral 
seisin was not permitted, or alternatively that Bahrain held such a view, which must have 
been obvious to Qatar when it agreed to the revised wording.279 The Court would 
arguably have been prevented or at least discouraged from adopting a strained and 
unconvincing semantic analysis, to justify the conclusion it apparently wished to arrive at, 
and Qatar would have been precluded in good faith from maintaining the interpretation 
which the majority ultimately accepted. 
The above brief survey suggests that the approach suggested can make a useful 
contribution to courts' and tribunal's interpretative efforts.  Judges will be less tempted or 
able to use textual analysis to achieve interpretations seen as desirable for other reasons.  
Also, given the prevalence of ambiguity recognised by the modern contract-based 
approach, judges will not be forced to resort to devices, merely to justify use of evidence 
they consider relevant.  The current frequent or habitual recourse to preparatory works280 
will be regularised, by both the need to check for evidence of actual intentions, and the 
admission that ambiguity is the norm. 
As an ancillary benefit, we can speculate that a closer approximation between the 
processes of contract and treaty interpretation will bring us closer to a more coherent 
general understanding of how legal documents are to be interpreted.  While it is not 
surprising that different areas of law have developed different rules, the law will be more 
comprehensible and defensible, if common issues are tackled in consistent ways. 
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Against these logical and procedural advantages, it could be argued that any change 
would be at the price of certainty.281 Location of actual intentions may be seen to be more 
difficult, less certain, and less predictable than merely reading a text.  Against this, it has 
been pointed out above, and Qatar v Bahrain confirms, that text can be at least as slippery 
as intentions, and just as open to abuse.  Arguably, if an actual intention can be located, 
then the interpretation is the most certain of all those possible.  Given that fictions such as 
"presumed" or "implied" intention are eschewed, there is nothing to suggest that the 
modern contract approach is any less certain than that which it would modify.   The 
opposite is more likely to be the case. 
Policy arguments of convenience and efficiency have been raised against the modern 
contract approach.  It is submitted with Professor McLauchlan,282 that these are 
unconvincing.  In international cases, the reality is that recourse to preparatory works is 
normal.283 If resort to preparatory works is inevitable, then adoption of the modern 
contract approach will make their use more rational, and is hardly likely to require 
significant further time or resource than is already expended.   If the enquiry is more 
focused on seeking to reveal what the parties intended, rather than simply hunting for 
evidence which might somehow help to support an interpretation favoured by one party 
or another, then disputes may actually be resolved more efficiently.  In any case, every 
time resort to the most appropriate or convincing evidence leads to an interpretation 
reflecting the actual intention of the parties, a more effective - and therefore more efficient 
in the long run – result should be achieved.  The modern contract or "actual intentions" 
approach should promote efficiency, not impede it. 
All of the above suggests that the proposed approach is logical, more likely to promote 
appropriate results, and is likely to be as efficient as the current textual orthodoxy.  One 
crucial criticism which must however be addressed, is whether such an approach is 
permissible within the law provided by articles 31 and 32.  There is little point advocating 
a system, if it would require revision of the treaty – surely an unlikely event.  Is the 
proposed approach consistent with the Convention provisions? 
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D The Modern Contract Approach and Articles 31 and 32 
The articles are silent on the purpose or basis of treaty interpretation, perhaps because 
the drafters chose to leave the matter, to avoid the doctrinal conflicts.284 As this implies an 
absence of common intention, the purpose proposed should be permissible – that is, not 
proscribed - so long as it is consistent with what is provided in the articles and is the most 
reasonable purpose.  It is surely unreasonable to suggest that treaty interpretation has or 
needs no purpose, meaning that some purpose must be able to be inferred. 
It is submitted that the requirement for interpretation in good faith favours the purpose 
and approach argued for.  Not to give effect to the will of the parties, when it is known or 
knowable, cuts across good faith.  It is difficult to envisage any other purpose – for instance 
such as to give effect to or elucidate the meaning of the text – which is able to satisfy the 
good faith requirement. 
Although intention is mentioned only in one paragraph,285 it can be seen as inherent in 
both the concept of object and purpose,286 and is the reason for reference to preparatory 
works in the first place.287 Further, the relevance of the intentions of the parties is 
confirmed, both in article 31(3)(a) and (b), and in 31(4).  Paragraph 4 is particularly 
compelling of the view that an established actual intention takes precedence.  All the 
modern contract insights are adding, therefore, is a logical extension or conclusion, 
showing the importance or determinative quality of intentions, where they can be 
established.  The articles already accept, as did their drafters, that the intentions of the 
parties are relevant.  It is therefore the task of the interpreter to discover intentions when 
this is possible, and therefore to give effect to them.   
It must be recalled that the ILC intended the process of interpretation to be a unity, 
with all methods thrown in the crucible.288 Such an approach is far more consistent with 
giving preference to actual common intention, than it is with insisting on the primacy of 
text, especially when several of the elements rely on, or seek to locate, an actual intention.  
In fact, the explicit denial of any hierarchy, and the relegation of the text to the "starting 
point",289 confirms that text and ordinary meaning are one of several means to an end, not 
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the end itself.  The most appropriate conclusion is that article 31 is consistent with, where 
possible, finding the actual intention of the parties. 
It is true that article 32 appears to relegate preparatory works to a subordinate position, 
apparently inconsistent with using the widest possible means to arrive at actual intention.  
It is clear, however, the ILC, in fact, intended wide or liberal recourse to the 
"supplementary means".290 Given the purpose of such access, to provide insight into 
intentions, the scheme of article 32 also supports interpretation according to the actual 
common intention of the parties. 
It is submitted that, as the articles were themselves originally a complex compromise, 
the proposed "actual or objective intentions, otherwise the most reasonable interpretation" 
approach is both consistent with the articles, and a better reflection of them than a reading 
which emphasises the primacy of the text or ordinary meaning.  The proposed approach 
gives both intentions and the words of the text their proper weight in resolving 
interpretations, with each likely to be determinative in different circumstances.  This in 
itself is a compromise, but one which is consistent with both the text and the intentions of 
the drafters, as far as they went, and is also logically defensible, and likely to lead to 
reasonable results. 
E Summary:  A New Way Forward? 
The above analysis suggests that there are no impediments, and clear advantages, to 
adopting the insights to be gained from the modern contract approach to interpretation.  
While the approach suggested can fairly be said to be rather different from the textualist 
orthodoxy which has emerged in recent years, it does not deny the importance of text, is 
arguably close to and consistent with the original intentions of the drafters, and is far more 
likely to resolve arguments over interpretation which clearly still persist, at least at World 
Court level.  It is to be hoped that widening acceptance of this modern contract approach 
will influence the approach which jurists and practitioners take in future to treaty 
interpretation. 
VII CONCLUSION 
I have argued that treaty interpretation has continued to be a source of controversy, 
because we have not been able to agree on what purpose interpretation is meant to serve.  
The majority of writers, diplomats and judges have been content to accept an apparently 
workable compromise, in the form of articles 31 and 32, and have been prepared also to 
assume that these impose a basically textual and hierarchical process on interpreters, albeit 
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one which contains considerable flexibility, and scope to the individual interpreter.  
However, as different interpreters continue to hold quite different views about the basic 
purpose of what they are doing, it is hardly surprising they often arrive at quite different 
results.  It has been submitted in this essay that this divergence of views remains 
unsatisfactory, and can lead courts and other interpreters to inappropriate and incoherent 
results.  It is further argued that difficulties will persist, if the nettle which was not grasped 
by the ILC continues to be ignored.   
It has been argued that contract law can point us in the right direction, to give 
appropriate prominence to the actual or objective intentions of treaty parties, wherever 
they can be discovered, thus accepting that discovering and giving effect to the will of the 
parties should be at the heart of treaty interpretation and treaty law.  While it can and has 
been argued that such an approach is in fact consistent with and implicit in articles 31 and 
32 themselves, it is evident that we need an appropriate stimulus to lead us to this 
necessary conclusion.   
Whether such stimulus comes from contract insights, or from within international law 
itself, it is clear that interpretation will continue to be unpredictable, sometimes arbitrary, 
and often controversial, if this matter is not resolved.  If articles 31 and 32 are to be more 
than devices in the hands of the interpreter who seeks to achieve a given or pre-
determined result, we must be prepared to answer the "purpose" question, in favour of the 
actual intentions of the parties. 
 
